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We study the competitive effects of restricting direct access to secondary care by gatekeeping, 
focusing on the informational role of general practitioners (GPs). In the secondary care 
market there are two hospitals choosing quality and specialisation. Patients, who are ex ante 
uninformed, can consult a GP to receive an (imperfect) diagnosis and obtain information 
about the secondary care market. We show that hospital competition is amplified by higher 
GP attendance but dampened by improved diagnosing accuracy. Therefore, compulsory 
gatekeeping may result in excessive quality competition and too much specialisation, unless 
the mismatch costs and the diagnosing accuracy are sufficiently high. Second-best price 
regulation makes direct regulation of GP consultation redundant, but will generally not 
implement first-best. 
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T h eU Ka n dt h eS c a n d i n a v i a nc o u n t r i e sa r ee x a m p l e so fc o u n t r i e sw h e r eg e n e r a lp r a c t i -
tioners (GPs) have a gatekeeping role in the health care system. Patients do not have
direct access to secondary care. They need a referral from their (primary care) GP to
get access to a hospital or a specialist.1 In the US, several health maintenance organisa-
tions (HMOs) also practice gatekeeping. Recently, however, some HMOs have relaxed the
restrictions on access to specialists (see, e.g., Ferris et al., 2001). In Germany, patients
need a referral to get access to a hospital and it has been on the political agenda to
also restrict direct access to specialist care by giving GPs a gatekeeper role. The current
paper contributes to the discussion on gatekeeping by analysing the competition eﬀects
that arise when GPs are equipped with a gatekeeping role.
In general, there are two main arguments for introducing gatekeeping in health care
markets (see Scott, 2000). First, it is usually claimed that gatekeepers contribute to cost
control by reducing ‘unnecessary’ interventions.2 Second, it is argued that secondary care
is used more eﬃciently since ‘GPs usually have better information than patients about
the quality of care available from secondary care providers’ (Scott, 2000, p. 1177). In the
present paper we focus on the second argument, highlighting the fact that making this
information available to patients changes the nature of competition between secondary
care providers, which in turn aﬀects the social desirability of gatekeeping.
As pointed out in a seminal paper by Arrow (1963), uncertainty and various informa-
tional problems make health care markets distinctly diﬀerent from most other markets.
The present paper stresses the importance of non-price competition between health care
providers, as well as the role of imperfect information in the relationship between pa-
tients and providers. Building on the familiar model of Hotelling (1929), we consider a
secondary care market with two providers (hospitals). In order to attract patients (and
obtain third party payments) the hospitals have two strategic variables at their disposal:
1In Sweden, though, individuals have direct access to hospital outpatient care, but still need a referral
if hospitalisation is required.
2Although this is a common argument for restricting access to secondary care, the empirical evidence
that gatekeeping actually contributes to lower health care expenditures seems to be scarce (see, e.g.,
Barros, 1998).
2location and quality of care. We refer to location as the specialisation or service mix
at a hospital, though it may also be interpreted in geographical terms. Thus, hospitals
engage in non-price competition in terms of both horizontal and vertical diﬀerentiation
of services.
The major aim of the paper is to highlight the informational role of GP gatekeepers
in secondary care markets. We assume that patients are ex ante uniformed about their
speciﬁc diagnosis and the exact characteristics of the hospitals. Thus, if they access
secondary care providers directly, their choices may be subject to substantial errors. First,
a patient may end up in a poor match, i.e., he may choose the hospital that is less able
to cure his disease. Second, he may decide to go to the hospital that provides the lower
quality of care. To reduce the risk of choosing the ‘wrong’ hospital, patients may therefore
(at some costs) consult a GP ﬁrst. The GPs are informed agents (middlemen) and convey
accurate information about hospital characteristics, i.e., quality and specialisation. They
also give attending patients a noisy diagnosis. Thus, the GPs are imperfect agents in the
sense that diagnosing accuracy is not perfect.3 When deciding whether to consult a GP or
to approach a hospital directly, patients weigh the consulting costs against the reduction
in (expected) mismatch costs due to better information.
The analysis is focused on two basic questions. (i) How does GP gatekeeping aﬀect
hospitals’ incentives to specialise and to invest in quality? (ii) Is strict gatekeeping — i.e.,
no access to secondary care without a GP referral — socially desirable? The answers to
these two questions are closely connected. Concerning the ﬁrst question, we show that
a higher GP attendance rate ampliﬁes quality competition and induces the hospitals to
specialise their services. The former is explained by the fact that informed patients are
sensitive to quality diﬀerences, while uninformed patients are not. The latter is due the
fact that hospitals can dampen quality competition by specialising their services.4
3Diagnosing accuracy may be determined by several factors like a GP’s skills, a GP’s eﬀort, a patient’s
disease type, etc. The physician agency literature analyses in detail strategic reasons for GPs to make
false reports or to exercise inappropriate levels of eﬀort (see McGuire, 2000, for an overview). Below we
discuss the part of this literature which is relevant for gatekeeping.
4A completely analogical feature is present in the location-price game by D’Aspremont et al. (1979),
where ﬁrms diﬀerentiate (specialise) to soften price competition. Like in their paper, the dampening-of-
competition eﬀect dominates the countervailing market-expanding eﬀect of locating closer to your rival.
For a more detailed discussion, see Brekke et al. (2005).
3Interestingly, the other information variable — diagnosing accuracy — has the exact
opposite eﬀect. When diagnosing accuracy is low, patients attending a GP put a larger
weight on quality diﬀerences than hospital specialisations, since the probability of a wrong
diagnosis is high. As a consequence, improved diagnosing accuracy tends to weaken
quality competition and, in turn, the corresponding incentives for specialisation. However,
improved diagnosing accuracy also increases the beneﬁt of consulting a GP, leading to
higher GP attendance, which, in turn, increases hospital competition. Thus, when the
patients’ decision of whether or not to attend a GP is endogenised, the latter (indirect)
eﬀect of improved diagnosing accuracy on hospital competition tends to counteract the
former (direct) eﬀect.5
Regarding the second question, we show that strict gatekeeping is detrimental to
welfare unless mismatch costs and diagnosing accuracy are suﬃciently high. The reason
is that both low mismatch costs and low diagnosing accuracy trigger hospital competition.
Since higher GP attendance has the same directional eﬀect on competition, as explained
above, strict gatekeeping tightens hospital competition even further. As a consequence,
hospitals engage in excessive competition, resulting in too high quality and too much
specialisation from a welfare perspective.6 However, if second-best price regulation is
available, there is no scope for direct regulation of GP attendance. Thus, the treatment
price is a suﬃcient instrument to induce second-best optimal quality and specialisation of
hospital care. Finally, we characterise the second-best equilibrium, showing that ﬁrst-best
is generally not achievable for the regulator.
The paper relates to both the general literature on spatial competition and the litera-
ture on (imperfect) competition in health care markets. The interaction between quality
and location choices has been investigated by Economides (1989) under price competi-
5In our speciﬁc model, with linear GP consultation costs, these two eﬀects exactly oﬀset, so that
equilibrium hospital specialisation and quality provision are unaﬀected by the degree of diagnosing accu-
racy. However, under (enforced or de facto) strict gatekeeping, where every patient attends a GP before
receiving secondary care, the indirect eﬀect is eliminated and improved diagnosing accuracy will dampen
hospital competition.
6This result is related to Dranove et al. (2003), who empirically analyse whether public disclosure of
patient health outcomes at the level of the individual physician or hospital (‘report cards’) is beneﬁcial
to patients and social welfare. They ﬁnd that report cards led to both selection behaviour by providers
and improved matching of patients with hospitals. However, on net this led to higher levels of resource
use and to worse health outcomes (for sicker patients).
4tion and Brekke et al. (2005) under price regulation.7 The present paper contributes to
this literature by introducing imperfect information into the framework. As previously
mentioned, we ﬁnd that the hospitals’ incentives to diﬀerentiate services crucially depend
o nt h ed e g r e eo fi n f o r m a t i o ni nt h em a r k e t . I np a r t i c u l a r ,w eﬁnd that the presence of
uninformed consumers tend to soften the incentives for horizontal diﬀerentiation. In this
respect our ﬁndings are in the spirit of Bester (1998), who shows that quality competi-
tion may induce minimum diﬀerentiation—i.e., agglomeration at the market centre—when
consumers are uncertain about product quality and use observed prices to ascertain the
quality of goods.
The paper also relates to the more general literature on transparency in imperfectly
competitive markets.8 Increased transparency on the consumer side of the market typi-
cally leads to intensiﬁed price competition and thus to a more socially desirable market
outcome. Our paper contributes to this literature by analysing the eﬀects of improved
transparency in markets that are characterised by non-price competition. In this case,
more intense competition between ﬁrms does not necessarily improve social welfare. Im-
proved market transparency consequently has ambiguous welfare eﬀects.9
Finally, our paper complements the multi-task agency literature on the economics
of general practice, e.g., Garcia Mariñoso and Jelovac (2003), Malcomson (2004) and
González (2004). These papers focus on the dual nature of GP activity, namely, on di-
agnosing patients and treating or referring them. Optimal payment systems are derived
that, at the same time, induce GPs to exert diagnosis eﬀort and give incentives for ef-
ﬁcient referral or treatment decisions, i.e., GP treatment for low severity diagnoses and
7Two other related papers applied to the primary care market are Gravelle (1999) and Nuscheler
(2003). Both papers address the issue of competition between physicians by investigating the interaction
between quality and location choices when prices are regulated. They apply a circular model with
attention directed towards entry of physicians into the market, so the focus of these papers is clearly
quite diﬀerent from ours. Calem and Rizzo (1995) also analyse horizontal and vertical diﬀerentiation of
hospitals. However, in contrast to our paper, they neither consider price regulation nor gatekeeping.
8See, e.g., Varian (1980), Burdett and Judd (1983), Lommerud and Sørgard (2003), Schultz (2004,
2005).
9Another related paper in this strand of the literature is Baye and Morgan (2001), who analyse the
competition eﬀects of information gatekeepers on the Internet, where such gatekeepers create a market
for price information by charging fees to ﬁrms that advertise prices and to consumers who access the list
of advertised prices.
5referral for high severity diagnoses.10 This also refers to the second gain of gatekeep-
ing: coordination of care improves since patients more appropriately treated by a GP are
screened out through costly diagnosing of all patients. On the other hand, as Malcomson
(2004) points out, patients who would not otherwise have been referred, may be referred
after being subject to costly diagnosis. Again, health care is used more eﬃciently. In
our paper, GPs are — on the one hand — perfect agents in the sense that they truthfully
convey the information about the secondary care market that they have, but — on the
other hand — imperfect agents in the sense that diagnosing is noisy. Although we consider
diagnosing accuracy to be exogenous, it can, in fact, be seen as a result of an incentive
contract like the ones derived in the above cited papers. Instead of analysing whether or
not a patient should be referred to a hospital, we consider that all patients will be referred
and concentrate on the improved matching of patients to hospitals through gatekeeping
GPs.11 Although important for the social desirability of gatekeeping, this has not been
analysed before. Moreover, we explicitly model the secondary care sector and introduce
imperfect competition, and thereby signiﬁcantly advance the literature. We demonstrate
that the information acquired through gatekeeping aﬀects competition amongst secondary
care providers and that this may generate — so far neglected — (adverse) eﬀects of such a
system.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The basic framework is presented
in Section 2. In Section 3, we analyse hospitals’ incentives for specialisation and quality in-
vestments for a given GP attendance rate. In Section 4, we endogenise the GP attendance
rate and characterise the corresponding specialisation-quality-consultation equilibrium.
Section 5 is devoted to welfare eﬀects of gatekeeping and regulation of GP attendance,
as well as second-best price regulation. Finally, in Section 6 we provide some concluding
remarks.
10Given the optimal contracts, the question of whether a gatekeeping system dominates free access to
secondary care is analysed. Without going into details here, the results are ambiguous.
11In the agency literature cited above, high severity patients ﬁn a l l ye n du pw i t has p e c i a l i s ta sG P s
are assumed to be unable to cure these patients. In this sense, our analysis deals with matching of high
severity patients to specialists or hospitals.
62T h e m o d e l
There is a continuum of patients with mass 1 distributed uniformly along the Hotelling
line S =[ 0 ,1]. The location of a patient is denoted z ∈ S and is associated with the
disease he suﬀers from. A disease z c a nb es e e na sar e a l i s a t i o no far a n d o mv a r i a b l eZ
which is uniformly distributed on S. All patients need one medical treatment to be cured.
There are two health care providers — henceforth called hospitals — both able to cure all
diseases. However, they are diﬀerentiated with respect to the disease they are best able to
cure. Specialisation of a hospital is denoted xi, i =1 ,2. In order to facilitate the analysis,
we assume that the hospitals are conﬁned to separate halves of the disease space S with











In addition to specialisation, there is a second strategic variable used by the hospitals
to attract patients, namely the quality of care qi ∈ [0,q], i =1 ,2. Quality costs are
a s s u m e dt ob es y m m e t r i ca n dq u a d r a t i c ,kq2
i,w h e r ek>0. Placing an upper bound q
on quality investments is a (crude) way of capturing that it is insurmountably costly to
increase quality beyond a certain level.12 Quality costs are considered to be ﬁxed, i.e., they
are independent of how many patients are actually treated.13 This implies that quality has
the characteristics of a public good at each hospital. Examples of such quality investments
are the cost of searching for and hiring more qualiﬁed medical staﬀ, additional training
of existing medical staﬀ, and investments in improved hospital facilities, which can be
related to both medical machinery and non-medical facilities such as room standard.14
Without loss of generality, other ﬁxed costs are set to zero. Marginal production costs are
assumed to be constant and equal to zero. This cost structure stresses the importance of
ﬁxed costs, which seems reasonable for the hospital market.
12We can, for instance, think of q as the best (state-of-the-art) technology or medical procedure available
in the market. Thus, increasing quality above this level is not possible.
13The assumption of production-independent quality costs is widely used in the literature on quality
competition in health care markets (see, e.g., Calem and Rizzo, 1995; Lyon, 1999; Gravelle and Masiero,
2000; Barros and Martinez-Giralt, 2002).
14Including variable quality costs would obviously imply a more general quality cost structure. However,
since prices are ﬁxed in our model, variable quality costs would only weaken the incentives for investing
in quality. It can readily be veriﬁed that this only complicates the analysis without providing any
qualitatively diﬀerent results. Interested readers may consult Ma and Burgess (1993) for the case of ﬁxed
locations or contact the authors for the case of endogenous locations.
7The price for one treatment is denoted p ≥ 0 and is set by some regulatory authority.15
The expected proﬁto fh o s p i t a li is given by
Πi = pDi − kq
2
i, (1)
where Di is expected demand for hospital i treatment.
A patient’s (ex-post) utility when going to hospital i is given by
u
z
i = v + qi − p − t(z − xi)
2. (2)
The maximum gross willingness to pay for hospital treatment, v, is assumed to be suﬃ-
ciently large for the entire market to be covered. Thereby, we preclude monopoly and kink
equilibria and concentrate on competitive ones.16 Notice that this assumption essentially
means that all patients have access to hospital or specialist care, which seems reasonable,
at least for developed countries (without waiting lists). The last term measures the mis-
match costs incurred when treated by hospital i =1 ,2.T h ep a r a m e t e rt>0 determines
the importance of mismatch costs relative to the quality of care. Of course, mismatch
costs would be zero if the patient suﬀers exactly from the disease for which the hospital
he attends is specialised. Mismatch costs are assumed to be quadratically increasing in
distance.
Patients are ex ante uninformed about both their own diagnosis and the qualities and
specialisations of hospitals. They only know v, the distribution of Z, and that hospital
treatment is required, but they cannot observe xi, qi,a n dz. For uninformed patients,
secondary care is an experience good, and the ex-post utility given by (2) can only be
learned through actual consumption. However, patients can obtain more information ex
ante by consulting a GP before accessing the hospital market. We assume that a GP will
convey accurate information about the secondary care market, i.e., hospitals’ qualities
and specialisations, and give the attending patient a diagnosis, i.e., a location on S.T h i s
15All results we derive also hold for constant marginal costs MC >0.L e te p denote the mill price, then
the mark-up is given by p = e p − MC.
16In a circular model, Economides (1993) and Nuscheler (2003) make similar assumptions, whereas
Salop (1979) and Gravelle (1999) study monopoly and kink equilibria in detail.
8diagnosis is noisy, though. We assume that the GP will provide the correct diagnosis with
an exogenous probability δ<1, which we henceforth term ‘diagnosing accuracy’. We then
make the simplifying assumption that incorrect diagnoses — that occur with probability
(1 − δ) — are uniformly distributed on S.17 Both the probability of a correct diagnosis and
the distribution of incorrect diagnoses are common knowledge. Thus, the GP is a perfect
agent in the sense that all information is truthfully conveyed to those patients consulting
the GP, but an imperfect agent in the sense that diagnosing accuracy is not perfect.
Realistically, there are some individual costs associated with attending a GP to ob-
tain information. To incorporate this, we assume cost heterogeneity with respect to GP
consultation, where y ∈ [0,1] denotes the cost type of a patient. The associated costs
a r et h e na s s u m e dt ob eay,w h e r ea>0. This heterogeneity can simply be justiﬁed by
an opportunity cost argument, e.g., by varying time costs due to diﬀerent wage earning
abilities. There are no other (direct) costs of gatekeeping. To simplify the analysis we
assume that patient types are uniformly distributed on the disease space S.A sar e s u l t ,
patients are uniformly distributed on the unit square with the disease (or diagnosis) on
o n ea x i sa n dc o s tt y p eo nt h eo t h e r .T h es h a r eo fp a t i e n t sc h o o s i n gt oo b t a i ni n f o r m a t i o n
through GP consultation is denoted by λ.
The available regulatory instruments for a social planner are assumed to be λ and p,
while hospital quality as well as hospital specialisation are not veriﬁable in a contractual
sense.18 Regarding regulation on λ, it is — in theory — possible to imagine that the
regulator can inﬂuence the amount of information available to patients in the market
through several diﬀerent means. We will, however, focus on what is probably the most
realistic regulatory instrument, namely introducing a strict gatekeeping regime, where all
patients are required to consult a GP before seeking secondary care. Thus, the scope for
regulating λ is restricted to setting λ =1 .
17This assumption eases the presentation of results, while still preserving the relevant features of
imperfect diagnosing. It may be more realistic to assume that the densities of incorrect diagnoses are
higher in the neighbourhood of the true location of a patient. Note, however, that the masspoint at the
true location in fact approximates such a density.
18This assumption is appropriate as the quality of care is, in general, diﬃcult to measure. To some
extent the regulator may be able to control hospital specialisations. We capture this by restricting
specialisation choices of hospitals to their respective halves of the unit interval.
9The eﬀect of GP gatekeeping to the market for secondary care is analysed in a 5-stage
game:
1. The regulator sets her available regulatory variables. These are one or both of p
and λ. Regulation on the latter variable is restricted to setting λ =1 .











3. The hospitals simultaneously set their quality levels q1 ∈ [0,q] and q2 ∈ [0,q].
4. Patients choose whether to consult a gatekeeping general practitioner and obtain
accurate information about xi and qi, and a diagnosis with accuracy δ<1.
5. All patients demand secondary care treatment.
The sequential structure of the game is argued by the diﬀerent degree of irreversibility
of strategic decisions. Clearly, the decision of whether to consult a gatekeeping GP and/or
w h i c hh o s p i t a lt og ot oi st h em o s tﬂexible decision to be taken in the entire game.
Changing quality or specialisation requires more eﬀort and investment. In both cases
it may be necessary to replace some medical machinery and/or have the current staﬀ
undergo signiﬁcant training, or even hire new staﬀ.A l t h o u g hi tm a ys o m e t i m e sb eh a r d
to distinguish between quality investments and a change of specialisation, it seems logically
consistent to assert that hospitals ﬁrst decide what to produce (their service or speciality
mix), and then determine the quality of services.19 This sequential structure is common in
models that combine horizontal and vertical diﬀerentiation (see, e.g., Economides, 1989;
Calem and Rizzo, 1995; Bester, 1998; Gravelle, 1999).
That the regulator can determine λ and p at the beginning of the game essentially
means that we consider commitment power on her side. This assumption is, of course,
crucial as in most sequential games. With respect to λ, this can easily be justiﬁed since
introducing a strict gatekeeping system (i.e., setting λ =1 )m u s tb er e g a r d e da sam a j o r
r e f o r mo ft h eh e a l t hc a r es y s t e m .T h i sm a yb el e s sc l e a rw i t ht h ep r i c e .A si nB r e k k ee ta l .
19Calem and Rizzo (1995) discuss this in some more detail.
10(2005) and Nuscheler (2003) there will be an incentive to reoptimise after specialisations
have been chosen. Nevertheless, since commitment is valuable for the regulator, one
could argue that she should be able to obtain such commitment power, either through
reputation or by creating institutional mechanisms that makes it costly, or otherwise
diﬃcult, to change the regulated price.20 In any case, since price regulation is not the
major focus of the present paper, we will concentrate on the full commitment case.
Although we have a game of imperfect information (the fraction 1−λ of the population
is uninformed about hospital quality, hospital specialisation and about their own disease;
the fraction λ(1−δ) receives accurate quality and specialisation information but a wrong
diagnosis), subgame perfection is the appropriate solution concept. We solve the game
by backward induction, starting with the demand for hospital care. Hospitals then play
their sequential specialisation-quality game for a given value of λ. This yields reaction
functions x∗
i(λ) and q∗
i(λ) for i =1 ,2. This game is analysed in Section 3.
As hospitals have no means to ‘signal’ their characteristics, neither specialisations
nor qualities are observed by patients, although hospitals move before patients decide
about whether to consult a GP (and obtain information) or not. Therefore, patients have
to decide on GP consultation for given values of the hospitals’ strategic variables. So,
in a game-theoretic sense, consultation decisions are simultaneous to the specialisation-
quality game. A reaction function λ∗(x1,x 2,q 1,q 2) results, and the equilibrium of the
specialisation-quality-consultation subgame is then, as usual, the intersection of the re-
action functions where actions are mutually best responses. This subgame is analysed in
Section 4.
The solution of the full game is relegated to Section 5, where social welfare and price
regulation is investigated.
20The assumption that a regulator can credibly commit to a given price (or, more generally, a given
transfer) is extensively applied in the literature, see e.g., Ma and Burgess (1993), Wolinsky (1997) and
Beitia (2003).
113 Hospital specialisation and quality
3.1 The demand for secondary care
As h a r e1−λ of the population does not consult a GP, and thus remains uninformed about
the actual quality levels and about specialisations. Moreover, these patients do not know
the exact disease they suﬀer from. To make a decision about which hospital to approach,
patients have to evaluate their expected utility of attending each hospital. As the game
is fully symmetric and since hospitals have no means to signal their characteristics, we
adopt the standard tie-breaking rule where both hospitals receive half of the uninformed
patients, (1 − λ)/2. Any other tie-breaking rule would yield qualitatively similar results.
As we concentrate on symmetric equilibria, we also impose symmetry here.
The residual fraction of the population, λ, consults a GP and obtains (perfect) informa-
tion about hospital characteristics. These patients are responsive to quality investments
and specialisation decisions, since both strategic variables are observed. Furthermore,
the patients consulting a GP receive an imperfect diagnosis. The probability of getting a
correct diagnosis is δ and is uniformly distributed on S. If a patient receives a diagnosis
z, the probability that he actually suﬀers from disease z is δ. With the remaining proba-
bility, 1−δ, z is just a draw from the uniform distribution over the unit interval S.T h u s ,




i = v + qi − δt(z − xi)





As long as δ>0, there exists a unique diagnosis, z, such that a patient who receives this
diagnosis is, in expectation, indiﬀerent between the two hospitals. This diagnosis is found
by solving Euz
1 = Euz






2tδ (x2 − x1)
−
(1 − x1 − x2)
2δ
. (4)
The expected demand for hospital 1 from GP-patients is then given by the expected
number of patients who receive a diagnosis z ≤ z. Since both true and incorrect diagnoses
are uniformly distributed on S, and diagnosing accuracy is the same for all locations,
12the reported diagnosis is also uniformly distributed on S, implying that the probability
of receiving a diagnosis z ≤ z is z. Thus, overall expected demand for hospital 1 is
D1 = λz +( 1− λ)/2, while hospital 2 expects to receive the residual demand D2 =
1 − D1 = λ(1 − z)+( 1− λ)/2.
3.2 Quality competition
For given locations and given GP attendance, optimal quality investments are found by
inserting demand derived above into the proﬁt function (1) and optimising with respect
to qi. We assume that δ>1
2. For this case, we show in the Appendix that, if q is not too
high, a unique pure strategy equilibrium in the quality subgame exists for all p>0 and










. This equilibrium is given by
q
∗






,i =1 ,2, (5)
where ∆ := x2 − x1. We see that equilibrium quality levels in the interior solution are
always symmetric and depend only on the distance between hospitals’ locations. This
is due to the absence of price competition, where quality investments have a market
expanding eﬀect which, due to the uniform distribution of patients, does not depend
on absolute locations. An immediate implication is that optimal specialisations will be
characterised by some certain distance and not by absolute locations.
Assuming an interior solution, the comparative static results are mostly straightfor-
ward. Less product diﬀerentiation (lower ∆) will intensify quality competition, i.e., com-
petition is intense when products are close substitutes. Furthermore, patients are more
responsive to quality improvements when mismatch costs are small, implying that t is a
measure of competition intensity. Not very surprisingly, an increase in the quality cost
parameter k has an adverse eﬀect on quality provision. The better medical treatments
a r ep a i d ,t h eh i g h e ra r et h eb e n e ﬁts of capturing market from the competitor. At this
stage of the game the only means of competition is the quality of care, and thus hospitals
will improve their quality as a response to an increase in p.
T h ed e g r e eo fi n f o r m a t i o ni nt h em a r k e ti sc a p t u r e db yt h et w op a r a m e t e r sλ and δ.A
13higher GP attendance (λ) leads to increased quality provision. This is quite intuitive, since
more patients obtain information about hospital qualities and thus become responsive to
possible quality diﬀerences between the hospitals. Improved diagnosing accuracy, on the
other hand, has the opposite eﬀect, which might seem a bit surprising at ﬁrst glance.21
The underlying mechanism is that lower diagnosing accuracy makes hospital quality a
relatively stronger signal for an imperfectly informed patient. If a patient is less certain
about his own location, and thus about the expected mismatch costs of attending each
hospital, he will attach more weight to hospital quality in making the decision of which
hospital to approach for treatment. In other words, improved diagnosing accuracy means
that information about hospital specialisation becomes more valuable for the patient. All
else equal, a higher value of δ thus reduces the degree of competition in the market and
leads to lower quality provision in equilibrium.
3.3 Specialisation
At this stage of the game hospitals decide on their specialisation, taking, for a given λ,
the eﬀects on quality competition and demand into account. We look for a symmetric
equilibrium in pure strategies. Inserting the optimal quality levels in the interior solution













As already mentioned, setting ∂Π1/∂x1 =0only yields ∆∗. There exists a continuum of















21Remember that patients receive perfect information about qualities and specialisations, while diag-
nosis information is imperfect.
22It is easily shown that the second-order conditions are met. Moreover, note that symmetry always










In addition, there are two possible corner solutions. If diﬀerentiation incentives are very
strong, the hospitals will locate at the endpoints, i.e., ∆∗ =1 . On the other hand, if the
upper bound on quality is suﬃciently low, the locations given by (7)-(8) will induce a
corner solution, qi = q, in the ensuing quality subgame. In this case, the equilibrium in
the location game is a corner solution where both hospitals locate at the midpoint, i.e.,
∆∗ =0 . In the following, we focus on the interior equilibrium given by (7)-(8).23
The hospitals’ location incentives are governed by two opposing forces. Ceteris paribus,
each hospital can obtain a larger share of the market by moving closer to its rival. On
the other hand, closer locations imply that quality competition is intensiﬁed, as can be
seen from equation (5).
Consider an increase in the treatment price p. This will strengthen the market share
eﬀect, since hospitals now receive a higher mark-up on each treatment. However, a price
increase also means that quality competition is ampliﬁe d . F r o m( 8 )w es e et h a tt h e
latter eﬀect always dominates: a higher price implies that hospitals aim at dampening
the resulting increase in quality competition by locating further apart.
A similar mechanism determines the relationship between GP attendance and loca-
tions. More informed patients will result in stronger quality competition, and hospitals
will respond by diﬀerentiating more.24 A social planner thus faces a trade-oﬀ when setting
the price or taking measures to improve information in the market. The improved quality
has to be weighed against the change in aggregate mismatch costs.
Like in the quality subgame, increased information about the secondary care market
through higher GP attendance and improved diagnosing accuracy yield opposite incentives
for hospital competition. Since improved diagnosing accuracy reduces the intensity of
23In the specialisation equilibrium given by (7) and (8), each hospital might also have an incentive to
deviate by locating at the midpoint, if such a relocation induces a corner solution in the quality subgame.
I tc a ne a s i l yb es h o w nt h a ts u c had e v i a t i o ni sn o tp r o ﬁtable unless q is suﬃciently low. We rule out this
possibility by assumption.
24This result is clearly dependent on the mode of competition. If we allow the ﬁrms (hospitals) to
compete on prices, and not qualities, the opposite result would apply (cf. Schultz, 2004).
15quality competition, hospitals choose to diﬀerentiate less.
We have already identiﬁed the mismatch cost parameter t as a measure of competition
intensity. A low t boosts quality provision and — to dampen this eﬀect — hospitals locate
further apart. Finally, an increase in the quality cost parameter k reduces quality com-
petition, resulting in less product diﬀerentiation. When inserting (8) into (5) we obtain









The following Proposition summarises the comparative statics results:
Proposition 1 The best responses of the specialisation-quality game are both increasing
in treatment price and GP consultation, and decreasing in mismatch costs, quality costs
and diagnosing accuracy.
4G P c o n s u l t a t i o n
In the previous section we derived the equilibrium of the specialisation-quality game for a
given value of λ, and equations (7), (8) and (9) show the respective best response functions
of the hospitals. To solve the game we now have to derive the best response of patients
to any given level of ∆ and q. This is done by letting patients make the choice of whether
or not to consult a GP to obtain more information, based on an assessment of expected
beneﬁts and costs.
When deciding whether to approach a (randomly chosen) hospital directly or to con-
sult a GP ﬁrst, a patient has to weigh the costs of going to a GP against the beneﬁts.
As the game is common knowledge, patients know that hospitals provide the same qual-
ity. Moreover, the quality received is independent of whether a GP was consulted or
not and therefore the consultation decision is independent of qualities. Determining the
(individual) beneﬁts of gatekeeping, and thereby the best response λ∗(∆),s i m p l yr e q u i r e s
ascertaining the reduction in expected mismatch costs for every degree of product dif-
ferentiation, ∆, in the market. To simplify the analysis we assume that patients know
16that the equilibrium will be symmetric, i.e., that hospitals locate equidistantly from the
market centre, but on opposite sides.
For a given degree of diﬀerentiation, ∆, expected mismatch costs for a patient who
























The ﬁrst term of equation (10) measures the expected mismatch costs when approaching
hospital 1 weighted with the probability that this hospital will actually be chosen (which,
applying our tie-breaking rule, is 1/2). Expected mismatch costs are calculated over the
entire disease space, since patients are unaware of their actual diagnosis. Accordingly, the
second term measures the expected mismatch costs when consulting hospital 2, weighted

















































Through GP consultation the patient obtains a diagnosis z and seeks treatment of hospital





. The associated expected mismatch costs are given by the ﬁrst line
of equation (11). With probability δ the diagnosis z is correct and the corresponding
mismatch costs are given by the ﬁrst term of the integrand (of the outer integral). With
the remaining probability 1 − δ the diagnosis z is false. The true disease may be at any
point of the unit interval and every disease is equally likely. The resulting mismatch costs





, the patient chooses
treatment of hospital 2 and, in expectation, incurs the second line as mismatch costs. The
expected beneﬁt of gatekeeping is thus




The best response λ∗(∆) is now obtained by equating the expected beneﬁts of gatekeeping






The comparative static results are intuitive. The higher consulting cost (a), the lower
the share of patients actually attending a GP for consultation. The beneﬁts of gate-
keeping are increasing in mismatch costs, since more costs may be avoided by obtaining
information. Expected mismatch costs are determined by three diﬀerent factors. For any
given positive distance between the hospitals, these costs are obviously increasing in the
mismatch cost parameter (t) and decreasing in the diagnosing accuracy (δ). In addition,
expected mismatch costs are increasing in the degree of horizontal diﬀerentiation. The
further apart the hospitals are located, the more costly, in terms of mismatch costs, to
attend the ‘wrong’ hospital.
Let us now turn to the solution of the game. Equations (8) and (13) deﬁne the two
reaction functions which determine the equilibrium attendance rate and diﬀerentiation,
λ∗ and ∆∗, so that the level of GP attendance is the best response to hospital specialisa-
tions, and vice versa. Assuming an interior solution for hospital diﬀerentiation and GP




























We are now ready to state the comparative static results of the specialisation-quality-
consultation subgame:
25Of course, ∆ = λ = q =0also is an equilibrium of the game, though not a very realistic one.
Moreover, this equilibrium immediately disappears when there is an arbitrarily small (but positive)
fraction of informed patients and, in this sense, the equilibrium is ‘unstable’. We therefore concentrate
on the equilibrium given in equations (14) to (16).
18Proposition 2 The specialisation-quality-consultation equilibrium has the following com-
parative static properties:
(i) GP attendance is increasing in treatment price, mismatch costs and diagnosing
accuracy, and decreasing in quality and attendance costs;
(ii) hospital diﬀerentiation is increasing in treatment price, decreasing in mismatch,
attendance and quality costs, and independent of diagnosing accuracy;
(iii) hospital quality is increasing in treatment price, decreasing in attendance and
quality costs, and independent of mismatch costs and diagnosing accuracy.
Several of these eﬀects are quite intuitive. The share of the population attending a
GP increases in the mismatch cost, t,a st h i sd r i v e su pt h eb e n e ﬁts of gatekeeping. It also
increases in the treatment price. This is an indirect eﬀect stemming from specialisation.
Price increases boost quality competition and, to dampen this eﬀect, hospitals aim at
reducing the substitutability of their services, increasing the beneﬁts of gatekeeping. Ob-
viously, λ∗ is a decreasing function of a. The higher the disutility incurred by consulting
a GP, the lower the share of patients who actually consult one. This reduces the com-
petitive pressure in the hospital market, leading to less diﬀerentiation and a lower supply
of quality. Equilibrium GP attendance is also increasing in the diagnosing accuracy, δ,
since improved accuracy reduces expected mismatch costs and thus increases the beneﬁts
of GP gatekeeping. Finally, an increase in the quality cost parameter, k, reduces quality
competition and thereby diﬀerentiation incentives. This, in turn, reduces the beneﬁts of
gatekeeping, leading to a lower GP attendance in equilibrium.
There are also some eﬀects that are less obvious. We see that the mismatch costs pa-
rameter t has no eﬀect on equilibrium hospital quality. With exogenous GP attendance,
patients were more responsive to quality investments at lower values of t, amplifying qual-
ity competition. With endogenous GP attendance, however, this eﬀe c ti sc o u n t e r a c t e db y
the consultation eﬀect. A lower t reduces the beneﬁts of gatekeeping, resulting in lower
GP attendance and thus a less competitive market. With linear costs of GP consultation
these two eﬀects exactly oﬀset. Interestingly, we also see that equilibrium hospital spe-
cialisation and quality provision are not aﬀected by diagnosing accuracy, δ.F o rag i v e n
level of GP attendance, we know that higher diagnosing accuracy reduces the degree of
19competition in the market, with lower quality provision and less diﬀerentiation (direct
eﬀect). However, a higher diagnosing accuracy also increases the value of information
obtained by attending a GP, leading to higher GP attendance, which, in turn, increases
the degree of hospital competition (indirect eﬀect). Thus, when the decision of whether
or not to attend a GP is taken into account, the indirect eﬀect of improved diagnosing
accuracy on hospital competition tends to counteract the direct eﬀect. In our speciﬁc
model, with linear GP consultation costs, these two eﬀects exactly oﬀset. Obviously, the
indirect eﬀect is eliminated if consultation costs are so low that all patients choose to con-
sult a GP before accessing the hospital market. In this case, the equilibrium is a corner
solution with λ∗ =1 , where improved diagnosing accuracy dampens competition between
secondary care providers.
5 Regulation and welfare
Consider a social planner who aims at maximising social welfare, deﬁned as the sum
of consumers’ and producers’ surpluses net of any government expenditures.26 Imposing
symmetry, and noting that aggregate GP consultation costs are a
R λ
0 sds = 1
2aλ2,e x p e c t e d
social welfare is given by





or, when substituting for M0 and MGP from equations (10) and (11),
W = v + q(1 − 2kq) −
t
12





The interpretation of (17) is straightforward. In addition to the gross utility of hospital
treatment (1. term), expected social welfare consists of the social net beneﬁt of quality
provision (2. term) net of expected aggregate mismatch costs (3. term) and aggregate
GP consultation costs (4. term).
26If we interpret p as a per treatment or per patient reimbursement from a government agency, we
implicitly assume that the third party (i.e., the regulator) is able to raise the necessary funds in a non-
distortionary manner.
205.1 The ﬁrst-best optimum
It is constructive to start out by considering the ﬁrst-best solution, where the regulator














First-best quality is found by equating marginal beneﬁts and marginal costs of quality
provision, and the solution is independent of specialisation and GP attendance.
Considering ﬁrst-best specialisations, for given levels of λ and δ, the regulator faces
the following trade-oﬀ: on the one hand, mismatch costs incurred by the fully informed
patients (share λδ) are minimised when hospitals locate symmetrically with a distance
∆ = 1
2. These locations are optimal if the entire population is fully informed (λδ =1 ). On
the other hand, as the fully uninformed patients (share 1−λ) choose a provider randomly
and the partially informed received a wrong diagnosis (share λ(1 − δ)), their mismatch
costs are minimised when hospitals do not diﬀerentiate their services at all (∆ =0 )a n d
locate at the market centre. These locations are optimal if there is no disease information







On the other hand, for a given degree of diﬀerentiation, optimal GP attendance in-
creases in hospital diﬀerentiation and in the mismatch cost parameter t.A n i n c r e a s e
in either ∆ or t increases the mismatch costs that can be avoided by seeing a GP, and
thus the beneﬁts of gatekeeping. When the diagnosing accuracy is high, mismatch costs
are reduced with a higher probability, making a GP visit more attractive. Obviously,
when consulting costs are large, the social planner would prefer that fewer patients are
approaching a GP. The complete characterisation of the ﬁrst-best solution is as follows:
Proposition 3 The ﬁrst-best eﬃcient solution has quality qfb = 1
4k and
(i) λfb =0and ∆fb =0for tδ2 < 8a,
(ii) λfb ∈ [0,1] and ∆fb = λfbδ
2 for tδ2 =8 a,a n d
(iii) λfb =1and ∆fb = δ
2 for tδ2 > 8a.
21Proof. The ﬁrst-best solution in (i) is an interior solution where both ﬁrst-order
conditions, ∆fb = λδ
2 and λfb = tδ∆
4a ,a r es a t i s ﬁed. As λ is restricted to the unit interval
there are situations where λfb = tδ∆
4a does not hold, i.e., when parameters are such that
λ exceeds one. Inserting ∆ = λδ
2 into (17) and diﬀerentiating yields ∂W
∂λ = λ
8 (tδ2 − 8a).
For tδ2 > 8a the regulator sets λ to its maximum, λfb =1 ,a n d∆fb = δ
2.T h er e g u l a t o r
is indiﬀerent between all feasible values of λ when tδ2 =8 a.
The characteristics of the ﬁrst-best solution can be explained by comparing the costs
of a gatekeeping system to its beneﬁts. The term tδ2 relates to the beneﬁts of such a
system, while 8a relates to its costs. The beneﬁt sa r eh i g h e ri fm o r em i s m a t c hc o s t s
can be saved by acquiring information. Of course, these beneﬁts are positively related
to the mismatch cost parameter t.B e n e ﬁts are also increasing in diagnosing accuracy,
since the unnecessary mismatch costs are saved with higher probability. In case (i) of the
proposition, where the beneﬁts of gatekeeping are small compared to its costs (tδ2 < 8a),
the social planner prefers a situation without any information in the market (λ =0 ). In
this case, aggregate mismatch costs are minimised when both ﬁrms do not diﬀerentiate and
agglomerate at the market centre. On the other hand, in case (iii), where the beneﬁts of
gatekeeping are high compared to its costs (tδ2 > 8a), the social planner wants maximum
market transparency (λ =1 ). Eﬃcient specialisation is then δ/2,w h i c hi s( f o ri m p e r f e c t
diagnosing) smaller than 1/2,r e ﬂecting the regulator’s trade-oﬀ as described above. The
intermediate case (ii) is a knife-edge result.
5.2 Regulation of GP attendance
Once quality and specialisation are not directly contractible, the regulator must use the
available regulatory instruments, p and/or λ, to balance several diﬀerent considerations,
and the ﬁrst-best optimum is, in general, not attainable. In this subsection we consider the
case of an exogenously given treatment price p,w h i c hm a yo rm a yn o tb ea tt h eo p t i m a l
second-best level, and see if and when the regulator has any incentives to regulate GP
attendance. As previously argued, regulation on λ realistically amounts to making GP
consultation compulsory by introducing a strict gatekeeping system, i.e., setting λ =1 .
Comparing (13) and (18) we see that, for a given degree of hospital diﬀerentiation,
22private and social incentives for GP attendance coincide. So why should a regulator dis-
tort GP consultation? The reason is that hospital specialisations in the ‘laissez-faire’
equilibrium, given by (14), do not necessarily produce a socially optimal degree of diﬀer-
entiation. Moreover, quality provision may be ineﬃcient. It may therefore be desirable to
make GP attendance compulsory, in order to aﬀect both hospital specialisations and qual-
ity investments in a socially desirable direction, even if this means that GP attendance
costs increase beyond the socially (and privately) optimal level. In order to investigate
the regulator’s incentives to introduce a strict gatekeeping regime, we have to evaluate
social welfare with, respectively, voluntary and compulsory GP consultation.
With voluntary GP consultation, expected social welfare is found by inserting the







(24a − 4p + tδ2)p
512ka2 . (19)
If the regulator enforces compulsory GP consultation,e x p e c t e ds o c i a lw e l f a r ei sf o u n db y
setting λ =1in the equilibrium expressions for ∆∗ (λ,p) and q∗ (λ,p) in (8) and (9), and
substituting into the welfare function (17), yielding
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Whether or not an introduction of a strict gatekeeping system is (for a given price)
socially desirable is then determined by the sign of the diﬀerence between (19) and (20).
Since it is not feasible to characterise this diﬀerence analytically, we resort to simulations.
In Tables 1 and 2 we present numerical examples of the eﬀects of strict gatekeeping,
focusing on the key parameters t and δ. For the remaining parameters of the model we
assume v =1 , p =0 .5, k =0 .5 and a =0 .25. Before we turn to the interpretation
of the tables, note that ﬁrst-best quality provision is qfb =0 .5.M o r e o v e r , f r o m t h e
ﬁrst order conditions for the ﬁrst-best, given in (18), we know that, for a given share
of informed patients, mismatch costs are minimised when diﬀerentiation is ∆ = λδ/2.
The characterisation of the ﬁrst-best optimum shows that a strict gatekeeping system is
eﬃcient whenever tδ2 > 8a (see Proposition 3). In our example, this is the case for δ =0 .9
23and t =2 .5 or t =3 .0 (highlighted by ∗∗ in Table 2).
Table 1: Voluntary GP consultation
Low accuracy: δ =0 .6 High accuracy: δ =0 .9
t λ∗ q∗ ∆∗ λ∗δ/2 W∗ λ∗ q∗ ∆∗ λ∗δ/2 W∗
1.0 0.30 0.25 0.50 0.09 1.053 0.45 0.25 0.50 0.20 1.067
1.5 0.37 0.25 0.41 0.11 1.017 0.55 0.25 0.41 0.25 1.038
2.0 0.42 0.25 0.35 0.13 0.981 0.64 0.25 0.35 0.29 1.009
2.5 0.47 0.25 0.32 0.14 0.945 0.71 0.25 0.32 0.32 0.980
3.0 0.52 0.25 0.29 0.16 0.909 0.78 0.25 0.29 0.35 0.951
Assumptions: v =1 , p =0 .5, k =0 .5, a =0 .25
Table 2: Compulsory GP consultation
Low accuracy: δ =0 .6 High accuracy: δ =0 .9
t λ q∗ ∆∗ λδ/2 W∗ λ q∗ ∆∗ λδ/2 W∗
1.0 1.00 0.56 0.75 0.30 1.011 1.00 0.43 0.65 0.45 1.077
1.5 1.00 0.49 0.57 0.30 1.006 1.00 0.37 0.50 0.45 1.059
2.0 1.00 0.44 0.47 0.30 0.986 1.00 0.34 0.41 0.45 1.033
2.5 1.00 0.41 0.41 0.30 0.958 1.00∗∗ 0.31 0.35 0.45 1.003
3.0 1.00 0.39 0.36 0.30 0.927 1.00∗∗ 0.30 0.31 0.45 0.971
Assumptions: v =1 , p =0 .5, k =0 .5, a =0 .25
Notes: Bold numbers indicate that compulsory gatekeeping improves social
welfare; ∗∗ means λfb =1 , otherwise λfb =0 .
Let us ﬁrst concentrate on a low diagnosing accuracy (δ =0 .6) and investigate the
role of the mismatch cost parameter t. With voluntary GP attendance (Table 1), higher
mismatch costs dampen incentives for quality competition, leading to less diﬀerentiation
in equilibrium. Since an increase in t directly increases the beneﬁts of gatekeeping, more
patients will consult a GP and, as a result, the incentives to invest in quality improve. In
our model these two opposing eﬀects exactly oﬀset so that equilibrium quality provision
remains unchanged. Compared to the ﬁrst-best solution, quality is too low and there is
24excessive diﬀerentiation for the given degree of information in the market (∆∗ >λ ∗δ/2).
The bold numbers in Table 2 reveal that compulsory gatekeeping is socially desirable for
t =2 .0,2.5,3.0 but not for t =1 .0,1.5. The intuition is clearly traceable, but perhaps not
immediately obvious.27 For low values of t, quality competition is tight. Since there is
no consultation eﬀect that softens quality competition (λ is ﬁxed to 1), there is excessive
quality competition (for t =1 .0) and excessive product diﬀerentiation. Thus, for suﬃ-
ciently strong competitive eﬀects the introduction of compulsory gatekeeping lowers social
welfare. For high values of t, on the other hand, compulsory gatekeeping makes quality
move in direction of the ﬁrst-best. As the competitive eﬀects are relatively moderate,
the impact on product diﬀerentiation is small. It is diﬃcult to assess the contribution of
product diﬀerentiation to social welfare, since the eﬃcient benchmark λ∗δ/2 changes with
the introduction of compulsory gatekeeping. In our example, mismatch costs are reduced
for all values of t and the reduction is larger for higher values of t.F o r t =3 .0 we get
close to the eﬃcient degree of specialisation.
Let us now turn to the eﬀect of diagnosing accuracy δ on the desirability of gatekeep-
ing. The comparative static analysis of the voluntary gatekeeping equilibrium, shown in
equations (14)-(16), demonstrated that δ only aﬀects equilibrium GP consultation but
not quality and specialisation (see also Table 1). The ineﬃciency in both variables is in-
dependent of δ and, in principle, an introduction of compulsory gatekeeping can, via the
competition eﬀect, improve the outcome. As already discussed above, the competition
eﬀect can be very strong for low values of t such that, for a low diagnosing accuracy,
excessive quality provision and too much diﬀerentiation make compulsory gatekeeping
socially harmful. However, from our analysis of the specialisation-quality game we know
that, for a given λ, an increase in diagnosing accuracy reduces the competitive pressure
and thereby quality and diﬀerentiation incentives. The competitive eﬀects of introducing
strict gatekeeping are thus smaller for higher levels of diagnosing accuracy. Therefore,
compulsory gatekeeping is more likely to be beneﬁcial for small values of t when δ is high.
From our example in Table 2 we see that compulsory gatekeeping is socially beneﬁcial for
27The most obvious intuition is maybe the following: for high mismatch cost parameters the beneﬁts
of gatekeeping are high, so compulsory gatekeeping is likely to be desirable. This intuition, however, is
wrong, since social and private incentives to see a GP coincide.
25all reported values of t when δ =0 .9, whereas it is not when δ =0 .6.
Finally, note that compulsory gatekeeping is beneﬁcial in 8 cases while the ﬁrst-best
optimum yields strict gatekeeping in only two of these cases. This conﬁrms our general
intuition that it can pay oﬀ to distort GP consultation in order to improve on the other
endogenous variables.
5.3 Price regulation
The above results hinge on the assumption that the treatment price is exogenous. We
will now relax this assumption and assume that the regulator is able also to use the price
as a regulatory instrument in an optimal way. Assuming second-best price regulation, the
following result obtains:
Proposition 4 With second-best price regulation and endogenous GP consultation deci-
sions, there is no scope for direct regulation of GP attendance.
Proof. I n s e r t i n g( 8 )a n d( 9 )i n t o( 1 7 )y i e l d saw e l f a r ef u n c t i o nW (p,λ).B yd e ﬁning
b p := pλ we can deﬁne a new welfare function c W (b p,λ): =W (∆∗ (b p),q∗ (b p),λ).M a x -
imising W (p,λ) with respect to p and λ is then equivalent to maximising c W (b p,λ) with
respect to b p and λ. Taking the partial derivative with respect to λ yields






∗ (b p). (21)
By comparing (18) and (21) we see that social and private incentives for GP attendance
coincide for every given value of ∆. The regulator can then use b p to induce the optimal
(second-best) levels of q and ∆ and let patients choose the socially optimal level of GP
attendance themselves.
When second-best pricing is available, there is no longer any need to use strict gate-
keeping as a regulatory mechanism to induce socially more desirable hospital diﬀerentia-
tion and quality provision. From (8) and (9) we know that p and λ have identical eﬀects
on equilibrium diﬀerentiation and quality provision. Thus, by using the price instrument
properly, the regulator can induce exactly the same specialisation-quality outcome for any
26given value of λ. Consider an increase in the share of informed patients in the market.
The resulting eﬀects — stronger quality competition and larger diﬀerentiation — can be
exactly oﬀset by reducing the price accordingly. If the regulator uses the price instrument
to induce second-best diﬀerentiation and quality provision, an optimal trade-oﬀ between
expected mismatch cost reductions and consultation costs will secure the socially optimal
level of GP attendance. And this is exactly the trade-oﬀ that patients make themselves
in the described game.
We now derive the second-best pricing policy where the regulator optimally trades
oﬀ ineﬃciencies along three dimensions: quality, specialisation and GP attendance. We
study the eﬃciency properties of the resulting equilibrium and also ask when second-best
price regulation will lead to a de facto strict gatekeeping system, where all patients choose
to consult a GP before demanding secondary care.28
Optimal price regulation can imply two possible regimes in this model. If the regulator
sets the price suﬃciently high, the ensuing equilibrium outcome in the specialisation-
quality game will be a corner solution with q = q and ∆ =0 . Equilibrium GP attendance
is then λ =0 . Alternatively, the regulator can induce an interior solution, i.e., q<q,
by setting a suﬃciently low price. It is easily shown that a corner solution is socially
preferable only if q is very small, and we rule out this possibility by assumption, focusing
instead on the interior solution.29 Maximising (19) with respect to p yields the following
second-best treatment price:
p





Perhaps the most interesting feature is that the optimal price is increasing in diag-
nosing accuracy, although δ does not aﬀect quality and specialisations in equilibrium.
The reason is that higher diagnosing accuracy increases the optimal degree of hospital
28Compared to the ﬁrst-best outcome, given in Proposition 3, λ∗ will — in interior solutions — be ineﬃ-
cent. Then the trade-oﬀ is indeed along three dimensions. Since λ∗ is eﬃcient for any given specialisation,
one may also argue that the trade-oﬀ is along two dimensions only.
29It is straightforward to show that the regulator will never induce a corner solution if
¡
24a + tδ2¢2
8192ka2 + q(2kq − 1) > 0.
27diﬀerentiation, from a welfare perspective. This reﬂects the trade-oﬀ between minimising
mismatch costs for fully informed patients, requiring ∆ = 1
2, and minimising expected
mismatch costs for uninformed patients, requiring ∆ =0 . A higher diagnosing accuracy
increases the degree of information about hospital specialisations in the market, implying
that the socially optimal specialisations move further away from the market centre. The
regulator must then stimulate more diﬀerentiation by increasing the treatment price.
The eﬀects of the consultation and mismatch cost parameters a and t are more straight-
forward. An increase in either type of cost dampens hospital competition, leading to less
diﬀerentiation and lower quality provision, eﬀects that can by counteracted by increasing
p.

































It is straightforward to show that second-best pricing yields an interior solution with
respect to GP attendance for a subset of the parameter values, deﬁned by k>k,w h e r e
k :=
tδ2 (24a + tδ2)
2048a3 .
Thus, if k ≤ k we have a corner solution with λsb =1 . Given that ∂k/∂t > 0, ∂k/∂δ > 0
and ∂k/∂a < 0, the following result obtains:
Proposition 5 Second-best price regulation implies a de facto strict gatekeeping regime
(λsb =1 )i fq u a l i t yc o s t so rG Pc o n s u l t i n gc o s t sa r es u ﬃciently small, or if mismatch
costs are suﬃciently high. Higher diagnosing accuracy makes λsb =1the outcome for a
larger set of parameter values.
The intuition is quite straightforward and follows from the previous analysis and dis-
cussion. A higher t increases expected mismatch costs, which makes GP gatekeeping more
desirable. Lower costs of quality provision (k)h a v et h es a m ek i n do fe ﬀe c t ,s i n c ei tl e a d s
to more diﬀerentiation in the hospital market. The expected reduction in mismatch costs
t h r o u g hG Pc o n s u l t a t i o ni si n c r e a s i n gi nd i a gnosing accuracy, making gatekeeping more
28desirable for higher levels of δ. Finally, a lower GP consulting cost (a) obviously means
that more patients consult a GP to obtain information.
For the ﬁnal part of the analysis, we will focus on interior solutions, implying that GP
attendance is generally ineﬃcient, compared with the ﬁrst-best solution.30 The eﬃciency
properties of the second-best interior solution are summarised as follows:
Proposition 6 The second-best (interior) solution of the specialisation-quality-consultation
game has the following eﬃciency properties:
(i) for tδ2 < 8a, there is too much diﬀerentiation given λsb, and too low quality provi-
sion;
(ii) for tδ2 =8 a,d i ﬀerentiation is ﬁrst-best given λsb and ﬁrst-best quality is imple-
mented;
(iii) for tδ2 > 8a, there is insuﬃcient diﬀerentiation given λsb, and too high quality
provision.
Proof. First-best specialisation, conditional on the share of GP-patients, requires












> (<)0 if tδ
2 < (>)8a.
First-best quality is given by qfb = 1






< (>)0 if tδ
2 < (>)8a.
The ﬁrst observation worth making from Proposition 6 is that the ﬁrst-best outcome
with respect to both hospital diﬀerentiation and quality provision is — apart from the
knife-edge case (ii) — never achieved. This should not be too surprising, though, since the
regulator has more policy goals than regulatory instruments.
30For a discussion of optimal price regulation under complete information, i.e., where λδ =1 ,s e e
Brekke et al. (2005).
29To see the intuition for the general eﬃciency characteristics of the second-best equi-
librium, consider regimes (i) and (iii), where the beneﬁts of gatekeeping are either low
or high compared to its costs. Note ﬁrst that an interior solution with respect to GP
attendance requires that GP consultation costs are suﬃciently high. From (16) we know
that a high value of a implies that quality provision will be relatively low in equilibrium.
If, in addition, mismatch costs and/or diagnosing accuracy are relatively low, the value
and/or the probability of obtaining information will be small and, consequently, GP at-
tendance will be low in equilibrium. Since the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient level of quality provision
is independent of mismatch costs, this implies that social welfare is maximised at a low
degree of diﬀerentiation. In this case, tδ2 < 8a, the price that yields ﬁrst-best diﬀeren-
tiation is not high enough to generate eﬃcient quality provision. Thus, higher quality
can only be obtained at the expense of excessive diﬀerentiation, and these considerations
are optimally traded oﬀ at a price which yields under-provision of quality and too much
diﬀerentiation.
On the other hand, if mismatch costs are high, the ﬁrst-best level of diﬀerentiation
will be higher — closer to δ/2 — due to higher GP attendance. In this case, tδ2 > 8a,
the optimal degree of diﬀerentiation is obtained at a price that yields over-provision of
quality. Consequently, optimal regulation implies accepting a less than optimal degree of
diﬀerentiation in order to avoid too much over-investment in quality.
6 Concluding remarks
Equipping GPs with a gatekeeper role in the health care system is a major issue in the
debate on health care reforms. Among politicians, the conventional wisdom is that gate-
keeping contributes to cost control. This is somewhat surprising since evidence is lacking,
as was demonstrated in an empirical study by Barros (1998). As GPs are usually better
informed than patients about the characteristics of the secondary health care market,
e.g., about quality and specialisation of hospitals, matching of patients to hospitals may
be improved by gatekeeping. However, this argument neglects the potential competitive
eﬀects in the hospital market. We have presented a model that analyses the competitive
30eﬀects of gatekeeping in the presence of hospital non-price competition.
While prices were regulated, we allowed for competition in specialisation and quality.
We found that when the price is exogenously given, strict gatekeeping may reduce social
welfare, especially if mismatch costs and diagnosing accuracy are both suﬃciently low.
In this case, making it compulsory to attend a GP before receiving secondary care will
boost competition to such an extent that excessive hospital specialisation and quality
occur. This raises doubts about whether gatekeeping improves eﬃciency. Things change
dramatically when allowing for second-best price regulation. In this case, we showed
that there is no scope for direct regulation of GP attendance, since consultation decisions
of patients are the same as what a social planner would implement. A de facto strict
gatekeeping regime arises endogenously if the beneﬁts of gatekeeping are suﬃciently high
(improved matching outweighs the potentially negative competitive eﬀects) compared to
its costs. Finally, we considered the (interior) second-best equilibrium, showing that the
solution, in general, will be characterised by ineﬃcient levels of quality, specialisation and
GP attendance, depending on the relative values of mismatch costs, consultation costs
and the diagnosing accuracy.
The analysis demonstrates that eﬃciency gains that are usually attributed to GP
gatekeeping cannot be taken for granted when the secondary care sector is endogenised
and non-price competition amongst providers is considered. In the short run, eﬃciency
gains may indeed be obtained by better matches. However, quality provision may still be
ineﬃcient. In the long run, hospitals will adjust their specialisation so that diﬀerentiation
increases, which might counteract the positive short run eﬀect.
Appendix. Equilibrium in the quality subgame
In this Appendix we show that the pure strategy equilibrium of the quality subgame is
indeed given by equation (5) if the upper bound on quality, q, is not too high. Consider
ﬁrst an interior solution, q∗
1 = q∗















31where ∆ := x2−x1. Let us now check for possible proﬁtable deviations for hospital 1. An
obvious implication from the ﬁrst-order conditions is that a deviation implying z ∈ (0,1)
is never proﬁtable. Thus, any possibly proﬁtable deviation must imply that the deviating
hospital serves only the completely uninformed patients, i.e., z =0 . Optimal deviation is





















Let us now study the properties of Φ1:S i n c ef o rp =0both proﬁts are zero, Π1(0,λ)=
b Π1 (0,λ)=0 ,w eh a v eΦ1 (0,λ)=0 . So, not surprisingly, there is no incentive to deviate
















8kt2δ2∆2 < 0. (A5)
The second term of (A4) is negative as long as p>0 and δ<1. Thus, for deviation to






(x1 + x2 + δ − 1)λ
2δ
> 0. (A6)













2,t h e r ee x i s t sas u ﬃciently low value of p such that deviation is not proﬁtable.
The concavity of Φ1, shown in equation (A5), demonstrates that deviation may well be
(and will be) proﬁtable for suﬃciently high values of p. In the next paragraph we deﬁne
the upper bound for quality, q, such that this will never happen.
Now consider a corner solution. Due to the ﬁrst-order conditions, where quality in-
centives depend on relative, but not absolute, locations, the corner solution must also be
32symmetric; q∗
1 = q∗
























∂p > 0 and
∂Φ(p,λ,q)
λ > 0.
From (5) we know that the interior solution, q∗
i(p,λ), is monotonically increasing in p
and λ.N o wd e ﬁne p and q such that q∗
i (p,1) = q and Φ1 (p,1) ≥ 0. Then we know that
Φ1 (p,λ) ≥ 0 for p ≤ p (if δ>1/2)a n dΦ1 (p,λ,q) ≥ 0 for p>p (by proper deﬁnition
of q). It follows that, if δ>1











. This equilibrium is given by (5).
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36Symbols in order of appearance in the text
S =[ 0 ,1] Disease set
z ∈ S Disease











Specialisation of provider 1 and 2, respectively
qi ∈ [0,q],i=1 ,2 Quality of secondary care of provider i
k>0 Quality cost parameter
p ≥ 0 Price per treatment or patient
Πi,i=1 ,2 Proﬁto fp r o v i d e ri
Di,i=1 ,2 Demand for treatment at provider i
uz
i,i=1 ,2 Utility to patient z when receiving treatment from provider i
v>0 Quality independent willingness to pay for secondary care treatment
t>0 Mismatch cost parameter
δ ∈ (0,1) GP diagnosing accuracy (probability of correct diagnosis)
y ∈ [0,1] Consultation cost type of a patient
a>0 Consultation cost parameter
λ ∈ [0,1] GP attendance rate (share of patients consulting a GP)
z Disease of the GP attending patient who is indiﬀerent between providers
∆ := x2 − x1 Degree of product diﬀerentiation
M0 Expected mismatch costs with direct access
MGP Expected mismatch costs with GP attendance
B := M0 − MGP Beneﬁts of consulting a gatekeeping GP
W Social welfare function
index “fb”s t a n d s f o r “ ﬁrst best optimum”
index “sb” stands for “second best optimum”CESifo Working Paper Series 




1489 Johannes Becker and Clemens Fuest, Does Germany Collect Revenue from Taxing 
Capital Income?, June 2005 
 
1490 Axel Dreher and Panu Poutvaara, Student Flows and Migration: An Empirical Analysis, 
June 2005 
 
1491 Bernd Huber and Marco Runkel, Interregional Redistribution and Budget Institutions 
under Asymmetric Information, June 2005 
 
1492 Guido Tabellini, Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of 
Europe, July 2005 
 
1493 Kurt R. Brekke and Michael Kuhn, Direct to Consumer Advertising in Pharmaceutical 
Markets, July 2005 
 
1494 Martín Gonzalez-Eiras and Dirk Niepelt, Sustaining Social Security, July 2005 
 
1495 Alfons J. Weichenrieder, (Why) Do we need Corporate Taxation?, July 2005 
 
1496 Paolo M. Panteghini, S-Based Taxation under Default Risk, July 2005 
 
1497 Panos Hatzipanayotou and Michael S. Michael, Migration, Tied Foreign Aid and the 
Welfare State, July 2005 
 
1498 Agata Antkiewicz and John Whalley, BRICSAM and the Non-WTO, July 2005 
 
1499 Petr Hedbávný, Ondřej Schneider and Jan Zápal, A Fiscal Rule that has Teeth: A 
Suggestion for a ‘Fiscal Sustainability Council’ underpinned by the Financial Markets, 
July 2005 
 
1500 J. Atsu Amegashie and Marco Runkel, Sabotaging Potential Rivals, July 2005 
 
1501 Heikki Oksanen, Actuarial Neutrality across Generations Applied to Public Pensions 
under Population Ageing: Effects on Government Finances and National Saving, July 
2005 
 
1502 Xenia Matschke, Costly Revenue-Raising and the Case for Favoring Import-Competing 
Industries, July 2005 
 
1503 Horst Raff and Nicolas Schmitt, Why Parallel Trade may Raise Producers Profits, July 
2005 
 
1504 Alberto Bisin and Piero Gottardi, Efficient Competitive Equilibria with Adverse 
Selection, July 2005 
  
1505 Peter A. Zadrozny, Necessary and Sufficient Restrictions for Existence of a Unique 
Fourth Moment of a Univariate GARCH(p,q) Process, July 2005 
 
1506 Rainer Niemann and Corinna Treisch, Group Taxation, Asymmetric Taxation and 
Cross-Border Investment Incentives in Austria, July 2005 
 
1507 Thomas Christiaans, Thomas Eichner and Ruediger Pethig, Optimal Pest Control in 
Agriculture, July 2005 
 
1508 Biswa N. Bhattacharyay and Prabir De, Promotion of Trade and Investments between 
China and India: The Case of Southwest China and East and Northeast India, July 2005 
 
1509 Jean Hindriks and Ben Lockwood, Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: 
Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare, July 2005 
 
1510 Michelle R. Garfinkel, Stergios Skaperdas and Constantinos Syropoulos, Globalization 
and Domestic Conflict, July 2005 
 
1511 Jesús Crespo-Cuaresma, Balázs Égert and Ronald MacDonald, Non-Linear Exchange 
Rate Dynamics in Target Zones: A Bumpy Road towards a Honeymoon – Some 
Evidence from the ERM, ERM2 and Selected New EU Member States, July 2005 
 
1512 David S. Evans and Michael Salinger, Curing Sinus Headaches and Tying Law: An 
Empirical Analysis of Bundling Decongestants and Pain Relievers, August 2005 
 
1513 Christian Keuschnigg and Martin D. Dietz, A Growth Oriented Dual Income Tax, July 
2005 
 
1514 Fahad Khalil, David Martimort and Bruno Parigi, Monitoring a Common Agent: 
Implications for Financial Contracting, August 2005 
 
1515 Volker Grossmann and Panu Poutvaara, Pareto-Improving Bequest Taxation, August 
2005 
 
1516 Lars P. Feld and Emmanuelle Reulier, Strategic Tax Competition in Switzerland: 
Evidence from a Panel of the Swiss Cantons, August 2005 
 
1517 Kira Boerner and Silke Uebelmesser, Migration and the Welfare State: The Economic 
Power of the Non-Voter?, August 2005 
 
1518 Gabriela Schütz, Heinrich W. Ursprung and Ludger Wößmann, Education Policy and 
Equality of Opportunity, August 2005 
 
1519 David S. Evans and Michael A. Salinger, Curing Sinus Headaches and Tying Law: An 
Empirical Analysis of Bundling Decongestants and Pain Relievers, August 2005 
 
1520 Michel Beine, Paul De Grauwe and Marianna Grimaldi, The Impact of FX Central Bank 
Intervention in a Noise Trading Framework, August 2005 
 
1521 Volker Meier and Matthias Wrede, Pension, Fertility, and Education, August 2005  
1522 Saku Aura and Thomas Davidoff, Optimal Commodity Taxation when Land and 
Structures must be Taxed at the Same Rate, August 2005 
 
1523 Andreas Haufler and Søren Bo Nielsen, Merger Policy to Promote ‘Global Players’? A 
Simple Model, August 2005 
 
1524 Frederick van der Ploeg, The Making of Cultural Policy: A European Perspective, 
August 2005 
 
1525 Alexander Kemnitz, Can Immigrant Employment Alleviate the Demographic Burden? 
The Role of Union Centralization, August 2005 
 
1526 Baoline Chen and Peter A. Zadrozny, Estimated U.S. Manufacturing Production Capital 
and Technology Based on an Estimated Dynamic Economic Model, August 2005 
 
1527 Marcel Gérard, Multijurisdictional Firms and Governments’ Strategies under 
Alternative Tax Designs, August 2005 
 
1528 Joerg Breitscheidel and Hans Gersbach, Self-Financing Environmental Mechanisms, 
August 2005 
 
1529 Giorgio Fazio, Ronald MacDonald and Jacques Mélitz, Trade Costs, Trade Balances 
and Current Accounts: An Application of Gravity to Multilateral Trade, August 2005 
 
1530 Thomas Christiaans, Thomas Eichner and Ruediger Pethig, A Micro-Level ‘Consumer 
Approach’ to Species Population Dynamics, August 2005 
 
1531 Samuel Hanson, M. Hashem Pesaran and Til Schuermann, Firm Heterogeneity and 
Credit Risk Diversification, August 2005 
 
1532 Mark Mink and Jakob de Haan, Has the Stability and Growth Pact Impeded Political 
Budget Cycles in the European Union?, September 2005 
 
1533 Roberta Colavecchio, Declan Curran and Michael Funke, Drifting Together or Falling 
Apart? The Empirics of Regional Economic Growth in Post-Unification Germany, 
September 2005 
 
1534 Kai A. Konrad and Stergios Skaperdas, Succession Rules and Leadership Rents, 
September 2005 
 
1535 Robert Dur and Amihai Glazer, The Desire for Impact, September 2005 
 
1536 Wolfgang Buchholz and Wolfgang Peters, Justifying the Lindahl Solution as an 
Outcome of Fair Cooperation, September 2005 
 
1537 Pieter A. Gautier, Coen N. Teulings and Aico van Vuuren, On-the-Job Search and 
Sorting, September 2005 
 
1538 Leif Danziger, Output Effects of Inflation with Fixed Price- and Quantity-Adjustment 
Costs, September 2005  
1539 Gerhard Glomm, Juergen Jung, Changmin Lee and Chung Tran, Public Pensions and 
Capital Accumulation: The Case of Brazil, September 2005 
 
1540 Yvonne Adema, Lex Meijdam and Harrie A. A. Verbon, The International Spillover 
Effects of Pension Reform, September 2005 
 
1541 Richard Disney, Household Saving Rates and the Design of Social Security 
Programmes: Evidence from a Country Panel, September 2005 
 
1542 David Dorn and Alfonso Sousa-Poza, Early Retirement: Free Choice or Forced 
Decision?, September 2005 
 
1543 Clara Graziano and Annalisa Luporini, Ownership Concentration, Monitoring and 
Optimal Board Structure, September 2005 
 
1544 Panu Poutvaara, Social Security Incentives, Human Capital Investment and Mobility of 
Labor, September 2005 
 
1545 Kjell Erik Lommerud, Frode Meland and Odd Rune Straume, Can Deunionization Lead 
to International Outsourcing?, September 2005 
 
1546 Robert Inklaar, Richard Jong-A-Pin and Jakob de Haan, Trade and Business Cycle 
Synchronization in OECD Countries: A Re-examination, September 2005 
 
1547 Randall K. Filer and Marjorie Honig, Endogenous Pensions and Retirement Behavior, 
September 2005 
 
1548 M. Hashem Pesaran, Til Schuermann and Bjoern-Jakob Treutler, Global Business 
Cycles and Credit Risk, September 2005 
 
1549 Ruediger Pethig, Nonlinear Production, Abatement, Pollution and Materials Balance 
Reconsidered, September 2005 
 
1550 Antonis Adam and Thomas Moutos, Turkish Delight for Some, Cold Turkey for 
Others?: The Effects of the EU-Turkey Customs Union, September 2005 
 
1551 Peter Birch Sørensen, Dual Income Taxation: Why and how?, September 2005 
 
1552 Kurt R. Brekke, Robert Nuscheler and Odd Rune Straume, Gatekeeping in Health Care, 
September 2005 